


# ***RAISING FLAGS OF DIFFERENCE***



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## **SYNOPSIS**

Somewhere between the rainbow and the internet, a place that is important to you is struggling to maintain its integrity.

[Sue Clifford, From Place to Place, page 3.]

This dissertation is a study of modern nationalism, an ideology with strong roots in the last century, and regarded as one of the most pressing issues of our time. A term which is increasingly used in today's world to describe political movements across the globe, it is also held responsible by many for atrocities ranging from street disturbances to civil wars, and even, ultimately, the breakdown of society.

Firstly, examining the definition of the nation and the constructs of national identity, this study focuses on the rise of nationalism in the last ten years. From the new post-communist states to the war-grounds of Yugoslavia, from the peripheral regions of the European continent to the very heart of industrial Italy. The concluding section attempts to address the implications and consequences of the resurgence of nationalism, suggesting that if the human race is to progress into the new millennium we must urgently re-evaluate how we identify and live with one another.



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## Introduction

In the forever shortening shadow of the new millennium, the term 'nationalism' seems to refer to an ever increasing number of events around the globe. 'Nationalism' is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as a movement for independence of a state (people) ruled by another, and once this is established, a loyalty or devotion to one's country.

Watching television, or reading the newspaper, we are digesting increasingly frequent images of 'new' flags being waved by 'nationalists' in Quebec, Pandania, the Caucasian states of the former USSR. More extremely, guerrillas in Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Basque region and Northern Ireland fight (and terrorise) in the cause of independence for 'their' nation.

'Nationalism' is not only located in far away places (in some other place), but similar trends can be witnessed closer to home. For example, the recent wave of anti-Europeanism and jingoism expressed by John Major of the Conservative government, and strong calls for devolution, even independence, by many politicians in Scotland and Wales. Described as "the strongest single factor in the existing network of interests, sentiments and ideas binding men into territorial (based) political groups" (1), nationalism, however, as an ideology seems to be malleable for each subject, interpreted and manipulated to suit. It is, therefore, difficult to use general interpretations to explain the diversity of nationalism around the world, for example Scotland's nationalist movement is seen as democratic, Russian nationalism as chauvinistic, and East German nationalism as racist.

I would like in this dissertation to discuss some of the reasons for, and the implications of, the recent upsurge in worldwide attempts to establish 'national identity'. I have set myself three sections of investigation. The first will help to

answer 'what is a nation?' and 'what does it mean to claim a national identity?' In the second section, I would like to try to explain and give reasons for the greater presence of nationalism in our world today. And thirdly, looking forward, what are the implications of this rise for the future?

## Chapter 1: Defining & imagining the nation



It is difficult to accurately pin-point what a 'nation' is. It is a word used in our contemporary world frequently to describe numerous groups of people in different contexts: established 'nations', such as France and Britain; new 'nations', formed democratically after the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, for example Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus. Conflict broke out in the former Yugoslavia due to the expansionist interests of the Serbian 'nation', while extremist separatists and terrorists create havoc around the world on the grounds of cultural or ethnic roots, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Kashmir Guerrillas in North India, the ETA (Basque Freedom and Homeland) in Spain.

The word is also becoming increasingly synonymous with racial and religious categorisations. The Afro-American community in the United States is referred to (most strongly by itself) as the black 'nation'. To many the 'nation' of Islam is also not an unfamiliar concept. In common with each, the word 'nation' is not merely describing a 'people', or community, it is also demanding recognition of its legitimacy as an autonomous political entity.

All of the above also echo one of Eric Hobsbawm's definitions of a 'nation', which states that "firstly, a nation is a group of people inside a particular state, another word for democracy...The other meaning denotes a state which is defined ethnically, culturally or religiously" (2). Both definitions are linked by a limiting factor, that being a 'state', a set boundary.

The phenomenon of a 'nation-state' is historically a relatively modern one, originating in the Americas during the late 18th century. The first independent state, free from imperial dynasty, was formed after the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, which asserted freedom from the ruling power of Great Britain over North America.

Shortly after, encapsulating the ideas of the late Enlightenment fermenting in Europe at that time, and inspired by events in the New World, it was paralleled in the Old World by the French Revolution in 1789:

Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the common good. The source of all sovereignty, lies essentially in all the nation. (3)

The idea that each person is born free and equal, (although feminists and social rights activists would disagree in that historical situation), posed a fundamental challenge to the predominant modes of thought that society was naturally organised around and under a rigid hierarchy, with land-owning lords at the top; a belief which grounded political authority in heredity, divine right, or natural law within a feudal Europe.

After over two hundred years the 'nation-state' is primarily today a political model, accepted as a universal norm. With a central government, it (supposedly) organises our education, welfare, health care and defence, using as Benedict Anderson penetratingly remarks, "using clocked, highly organised, highly centralised ways which organise the way we lead our lives." (4)

The modern 'nation-state' can indicate who lives within its borders as a citizen, and who cannot; what is legal, and what is not. For the citizen the 'nation-state' is also their protector, in the form of a police force or an army. As Ian Angel suggests:

Basically the nation is a Faustian pact. The individual submits his soul to the devil of the state, the legitimate violence of the state, so that they can be protected. (5)

In today's world of 'nation-states' all citizens are entitled, theoretically, to own a passport, which allows them to travel outwith their 'nation-state' of origin, to

visit other 'nation-states'. Within the passport the holder's date of birth, place of birth and nationality are clearly marked, placing this information next to a passport photograph, and authorising it with a stamp of the 'nation-state'. Not only does the passport give a factual and physical identity to the holder, it is also an authorised 'national' identity.

However, the passport, as an icon of authorised 'national' identity, in no way explains what it means to claim to have a national identity, or aspire to have one - it is only an acknowledged confirmation of one.

The next section of this essay will examine the general themes of nationalist consciousness, its habits of thinking and what it means to claim a 'national identity'. This will give a background to the later sections.

### *national identity & categories*

For most people 'national identity' explains a "state of mind, a common consciousness displayed by a group that they belong to a certain nation, sharing a similar culture of identity." (6). As Henri Tajfel, developer of the Social Identity Theory, (SIT) (7), proposes: "A nation will only exist if a body of people feel themselves to be a nation. "(8)

In more general terms he suggests that groups can only exist if members identify themselves with the group, in other words some form of common consciousness. It also presumes that the members know collectively what their group is, in terms of 'nation', what a 'nation' is.



Identification, according to SIT, is at root a form of categorisation. For groups to exist, individuals must categorise themselves into group terms, which essentially are divisive and segmental. To claim that you are part of one group/nation entails a categorical distinction from another group/nation:

The imagining of 'our' community involves imagining, either implicitly or explicitly, 'them', from whom 'we' are distinct (9)

Desmond TuTu, former Archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa, amiably puts it a simpler way:

Identity, over and against, is I am me, and I am not you. I have got my space, you have got your space. Also I take on other things which identify me as me; my language, the way I look, and the people I feel most comfortable. (10)

This statement identifies some of the most popular labels of distinction, including territory, language and culture, which could separate 'me' from 'you'.

Tajfel's theory also contains a strong motivational theme. Individuals, he claims, have a need for a positive social identity, or self-conception:

It can be assumed that an individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership of new groups, if these groups have some contribution to make to the positive aspects of their social identity. (11)

Groups, to achieve this positive identity, would need to compare themselves positively with another, who are not members of their group, so that they fare well from the comparison. For instance, groups will produce flattering stereotypes of themselves, and demeaning stereotypes of others, for the comparison. An element of distortion, therefore, is usually necessary to maintain positive self-identity - something which is, according to Tajfel, essential for the group's existence. Simply, if a group does not feel good about itself, nobody will want to be part of it.



According to Hogg and Abrams there are three stages in the process of group identification. Firstly, individuals categorise themselves as part of an 'ingroup', assigning themselves a social identity and distinguishing themselves from the relevant 'outgroup'. Then they learn the stereotypic norms associated with such an identity. Thirdly they assign these norms to themselves, and "thus their behaviour becomes more normative as their category membership becomes salient." (12). In this way a link is being made between self-identification and stereotyping.

As is mentioned in footnote (7), Social Identity Theory is not specifically a study of national groupings. Two critical points are highlighted by Michael Billig, about its application to 'national' identity. One is the universalism of SIT, and hence its neglect of the specific meaning of social categories. The second critical point concerns the theory's focus upon individual categorisation and fails to address how national identity becomes inhabited. Simply speaking, Billig is commenting that the specific meanings of nationalism are lost, if seen as just another form of 'group identity', comparable on the same level to religious, political, ethnic, sexuality, youth groups, and so on.

Social Identity Theorists argue that group members must think the group to be 'real'. Benedict Anderson, in describing the nation as an "imagined community", points out that the individual members "of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." (13)

The point made by Billig is not that because such groupings have to be psychologically imagined, they must all be psychologically similar. On the contrary, he argues that they have to be imagined in different ways. As Anderson suggests, communities are to be distinguished "by the style in which they are imagined." (14)

As far as national identity is concerned, not only do the members have to imagine themselves as 'nationals'; not only do they have to imagine their 'nation' as a community; they must also imagine that they know what a 'nation' is, and distinguish the identity of their own 'nation'.

### *living with the categories*

Social Identity Theory assumes that individuals have multiple ways of describing and categorising themselves, and that in different contexts, different identities become more prominent. A good metaphor for describing this may be switching on and off different aspects of social identity. For example, imagine a Pakistani-Scots woman: in a halal meat shop, she may engage in ethnic 'signalling' with a fellow Pakistani-Scot, i.e. speaking her native tongue, adjusting gesture and language to this particularly 'Asian' situation; in her women's group, for example, she may signal her solidarity with her wider community of women; there may be more conspicuous times when she is Glaswegian, or Scottish, at time of voting maybe. The cues that evoke such switching of identities can be quite subtle, and may not be recognised or consciously registered. Although the use of a particular identity may be intermittent, it is according to SIT, nevertheless a constant latency.

Again Billig argues against this generalisation of Social Identity Theory, by noting that it has little to say about what happens to the identity inbetween "self-conscious flag-waving" (15) national situations, like international sporting events. He claims that SIT presumes national identity becomes some kind of latency, where it stays within an individual's memory, awaiting 'active service'. There is much more to be said, he claims, about "national identity and its maintenance":

The latency of nationalistic consciousness does not depend on the vagaries of individuals memory...[How many people, if asked, will reply that they have forgotten what nationality they are?]. Nor does national identity disappear into individuals heads inbetween salient situations. (16)

The hypothetical citizen, while not consciously acting or thinking in a particular national way, continues to live in a nation-state and in a world of nations. This hypothetical citizen will continually encounter, if not consciously register 'flagged signs' of nationality. Billig concludes:

The apparently latent identity is maintained within the daily life of inhabited nations. The 'salient situation' does not suddenly occur, as if out of nothing, for it is a part of a wider rhythm of banal life in the world of nations. What this means is that national identity is more than an inner psychological state, or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life, which is daily lived in a world of 'nation-states'. (17)

### *Us, the nation*

So far the declarations of identity I have examined are predominately first person singular: expressions which 'I' make about 'myself'. This does not help us, however, to understand how the national 'we' is constructed, and what is meant by that.

According to Billig, the nation itself has to be conceived as something in existence, with its own identity:

only if the nation is imagined to have an identity, can 'we' claim 'ourselves' to have a national identity. (18)

A nation is imagined, argues Anderson in Imagined Communities, as a unique entity in terms of time and space. It is imagined as a community stretching through



time, with its own past and its own future destiny. It is also imagined across space, embracing the inhabitants of a particular area or territory.

The sense of time within the imagining creates a history, or biography, for the nation; their own history and no-one else's. It is no coincidence that the rise in nation-states is paralleled by the rise in the study of history, and the creation of national histories (19).

National histories will trace the development of the nation, in some cases from the unquestioned 'misty depths of time', its enemies, its allies, its wars, martyrs and traitors. National histories will have their special monuments, in which heroes and heroines side-step the banal continuity of time "to serve the narrative purpose" and "be remembered/forgotten as 'our own' " (20). Basically they tell the story of a people passing through time: 'our' people, with 'our' ways of life, 'our' uniqueness, a uniqueness which is further emphasised by emblems, 'our' flag, and showings of public solidarity, e.g. singing 'our' national anthem and national propaganda. It is this emphasis of uniqueness, or particularity, which attaches an identity to a nation, but:

the way 'we' assert 'our' particularity is not in itself particular. 'We' have a history, identity and flag, just like all those other 'we's. In this 'we' (whichever national 'we' is to be proclaimed) speak (or imagine ourselves to speak) a universal code of particularity. This mixture of universality and particularity enables nations to proclaim themselves as nations. (21)

If a nation is to proclaim itself a nation, it needs a name to do so. Returning to Social Identity Theory, 'we' must categorise 'ourselves' with a distinctive label, so that 'we' are British, or French (or Scots, or Breton) and so on. Such a category "not only categorises 'us' as an 'us' - but the category is to be categorised as a national label in its universality." (22). 'Our' name, 'our' national label, not only indicates who 'we' are, but on a much more basic level *that* 'we' are.



As noted above, a nation also has to be imagined across space, in other-words a national homeland for the imagined community. Peoples from the earliest times have nurtured a sense of their own communal distinctiveness, "in the specific history of the group, and in the myths of group origins and group liberation" (23). Yet nationhood involves an imagining of a particular type of community, rooted in a certain place. If we look back in history, to pre-modern Europe for example, not all peoples imagined themselves to be living within a 'country' in the sense that we look at nation-states as 'countries':

Under medieval serfdom, each serf was tied to a piece of land and to a particular lord. (24)

This differs from the modern world where "every inhabitant is expected to be tied to one national soil and one government, or to be an outcast" (25).

Just as Anderson's 'imagined community' has to be imagined beyond immediate experience, embracing more fellow members than those with which its citizens are personally acquainted, it involves the imagining of a confined totality, beyond the immediate experience of place. Unlike the mediaeval peasants, who would be intimately tied to each nook and crannie of 'their' land, it is quite likely that citizens of a nation-state may only have visited small parts of 'their' national homeland, and indeed be tourists or strangers in 'their' own land.

Another important characteristic of the modern nation-state, and its nationalistic imagination, is that nations stop and start abruptly at demarcated borders: one national territory in no way shades into an other. Boundaries mark the "limits of sovereign authority and [define] the spatial form of the contained political regions...[Boundaries] occur where the vertical interfaces between the state sovereignties intersect the surfaces of the earth." (26). Some follow natural frontiers, such as mountains, and natural dividers, for example seas and rivers. Others,

especially in former-colonised continents, are mapped out, and sectioned off, according to longitude and latitude.

A glance at a modern world political map reveals the globe flattened out and 'jigsaw-puzzled', in several ways resembling an abstract painting of Patrick Heron: very little shading and neat flat surfaces, separated from each other by different colours. One of the sections in this giant jigsaw is 'our' homeland, the place of 'our' personal homes:

my home, your home and, as such, it is the home of all of 'us', the home of homes, the place where all of 'us' are at home. (28)

In this sense, Billig describes the homeland imagined as a unit, which continues un-diluted right up to the borders, and there it stops; a vertical separating 'us' from the different foreign essence which marks out the territory on the other side. As Anderson writes:

In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory. (28)

Essentially, in the theory of nationhood, people, place and state should be bound in unity, something which is lodged deep down in nationalist consciousness (29).

### *Them - the foreigners*

If nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells 'us' who 'we' are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. As Henri Tajfel stressed in SIT, a social identity in describing who 'we' are, indicates who 'we' are not. In other words, there can be no 'us' without a 'them':

The national community can only be imagined by also imagining communities of foreigners. (30)

In the age of the nation-state, the 'foreigner' is not merely any 'other', but as Julia Kristeva points out, with the establishment of nation-states "we come to the only modern, acceptable, and clear definition of foreigners: the foreigner is the one who does not have the same nationality." (31). This comment separates the category 'foreigner' from inward-looking ideologies such as ethnocentrism. In formulating the concept of 'ethnocentrism', William Sumner wrote: "each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities and looks with contempt at others". He went on to claim that, "each group thinks its own 'folkways' the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other 'folkways', these excite scorn." (32)

The nationalist outlook, as both product and producer of national identity, differs crucially from Sumner's description of ethnocentrism, according to Michael Billig. He highlights the last sentence - a group is scornful *if* it observes that other groups have their folk-ways' - which presumes that the 'ingroup' is so isolated and wrapped up in their own concerns, that the outside world may be ignored. Billig argues the contrary. In fact nationalists live in an international world (their ideology in itself is international) and without observation of the world of nation-states, nationalists would not be able to claim that their nations met the universal codes of nationalism. Without looking about themselves, they would not be able to say who, or what they are. Nor would they have access to stereotyped judgements about foreigners, which as Tajfel mentioned, is essential for a positive self-identity, and hence the continuation of the nation.

To repeat, all nations, 'ours' and others, exist in a world of nations, and we imagine 'ourselves' and 'foreigners' to be equally ruled by the sociology of nationhood.



### Summary

To recapitulate, in our investigation into 'what a nation is', and 'what an national identity is' it is clear that a nation can only exist if a group of people imagine themselves to be a nation, no matter that group of people see it based on ethnic, racial, cultural grounds, or in a more liberal fashion, a nation-state.

By imagining a national community, it also involves imagining national communities of foreigners, from whom you are distinct. As I mentioned before, without looking about yourself, beyond yourself, you cannot say who you are.

To make yourself distinct from other nations you would have to distinguish that identity, using a name to call yourself, and claiming a national homeland, marking where it starts and ends. This identity can be shown to others by flying the national flag, creating national sports teams, cataloguing the nation's history, speaking the national language, singing folk-songs and so on.

All these particularities are not only signs and symbols, indicating which nationality you are, but that your national identity exists. In fact not only that it exists, but that others exist, in a world of nations where everyone has a flag, a national anthem and all the other trappings of the national identity.

In this section it has been pointed out that if a nation is to be established as a real entity, it has to be imagined in several ways. Once established, the imagination is inhabited by reality, and eventually becomes deeply ingrained into the consciousness of the people, so that it does not need to be imagined continuously. In this sense the term "imagined communities" could be deceptive. As Billig comments:

The community and its place are not so much imagined, but their absence becomes unimaginable. (34)



## Chapter 2: Filling the imagination with reality

The language of the nation, and the way in which a national identity is constructed, described in the first chapter, is in general abstract, and is closely connected with identity politics. It was useful to deconstruct and break down this language so that the general patterns and understandings of nationalism can be absorbed and retained, before writing about real events and facts.

I stated in the introduction that the application of nationalism in world politics is varied, and is engaged on different levels, from the extreme to the subtle. However, as I do not wish to let my investigation be weighed down and overloaded with examples, I will examine the so-called renaissance of nationalism in the context of Europe, within the last ten years, as I feel that it is possible from this region to cover the main factors and reasons for the recent rise in claims of national identity. On a global outlook, I may note that similarities in the rise and development of nationalism between my European examples, and that of world-wide cases. For example: the breakdown of the USSR with the post-war collapse, almost forty years earlier, of colonial empires in Africa and Asia; regional turned national claims of sovereignty in Great Britain (Scotland & Wales), France (Breton) and Italy (Pandania) are similar to those in Canada (Quebec) and India (Kashmir); and claims (often violent) for the formation of a new nation-state in the Basque region of Spain mirror those for a Palestine and Kurdish state.

### *The Last Empire*

To the outside world, the sequence of revolution in 1989 looked like a powder trail fired spontaneously by the pick axes biting into the top of the Berlin Wall. From the inside it didn't look like that because in each country there was a long and particular preparation. The image of clocks is less explosive but more apt. The various Eastern European clocks ran at different speeds, and the internal mechanism of each brought them to chime in 1989. (1)

The momentous events which followed the collective dismantling by Berliners of the wall that divided them, when Václav Havel stood on the balcony in Prague's Wenceslas Square, and crowds cheered the collapse of the communist regimes across Europe, many believed that a new era of liberal democracy was nigh. A whole generation, which had almost reconciled itself to growing old in the fearful paralysis of the Cold War, was suddenly witness to a new order of free nations taking shape from the Baltic republics to the Black Sea. In August 1991, when the Muscovites defended the Russian Parliament against tanks, the civic courage which had brought down the last twentieth century (Soviet) empire, it was believed that the movement might even be strong enough to sustain Russia's epic transition to full democracy.

The new order succeeded the two other great re-orderings of the nation-state system in Europe this century; at Versailles in 1918, when the new nations of Eastern Europe were created from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires; at Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill allocated the nation-states of Eastern and Western Europe to two spheres of influence. The difference between the re-ordering of nation-states, following the collapse of the Soviet empire and communist regimes in 1989, and those that had gone before, was that it occurred without any imperial settlement. There was no treaty to regulate the conflict between the territorial integrity of the emergent nation-states in Eastern Europe, and the right to self determination of the peoples within them. As Michael Ignatieff quite rightly notes:

Since 1989 we have entered the first era of global cosmopolitanism in which there is no frame-work of imperial order. (2)



As the imperial police of the Soviet empire departed, so too did any notions of 'working class internationalism'. The collapse of socialist ideas, values and images was inevitable. Discredited by so many years of bureaucratic manipulation and economic failure, socialism was widely seen as the doctrine of an '*ancien regime*'.

Michael Löwy remarks that "politics, like nature, hates a vacuum" (3). In this case questions of national identity filled the hole left behind by proletarian solidarity.

This powerful and dramatic reassessment by the peoples of the 'Eastern Bloc' countries, including Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, of their own collective identity transpired for several reasons. From a Western European point of view one may imagine that it began with Gorbachev. The general liberalisation of the Soviet communist dictatorship by the Soviet leader, encapsulated by the words 'perestroika' (reconstruction) and 'glasnost' (openness), allowed a greater decentralisation of the Union. It was also an acceptance of the principle that each member of the Warsaw Pact was free to arrange its own affairs. Decentralisation of political authority to local Communist parties in the fringe states, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia, with a greater freedom to express dissident political views, naturally led to the formation of opposition nationalist parties.

All of the above created an ambience in which revolutionary changes were possible. It should be pointed out, however, that freedom was not given on a plate, but had to be fought for (4). As noted by Gwyn Prins above, the rate of democratic change in Eastern Europe varied in different countries. For example in Poland Solidarnosc, the first trade union independent of Communist control, was formed in 1980, and led the way to democratic reform; and as early as January 1988 the Hungarian Democratic Forum, including reform economists, writers and scientists, was formed in Budapest, and was officially recognised eight months later by the Communist government.



It is claimed, however, that the roots of the revolution in the late Eighties of Eastern Europe lie much deeper:

Paradoxically, the revolution of 1989 was created by Lenin and Stalin. Almost from the moment when the Soviet empire, after Yalta, swallowed up the nations of Eastern Europe, the fight against Communism began. (5)

The annexation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union following World War Two, and the bi-polarisation of the Cold War formed an 'iron curtain', dividing Europe into two separate halves. Most of the nations, including Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany, had always been part of western civilisation in culture and history. Separation from that history left a deep imprint in the national consciousness of these countries. The invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the suppression of an uprising in Prague in 1968 by Soviet tanks, revealed that all was not well under Communism. If the constant threat of the Red Army's intervention was not present the Communists would have fallen from power in that part of Europe in the fifties (6).

It is understandable that once the threat of Soviet intervention was lifted through 'glasnost', the rebellion against decades of national discrimination and Great Russian hegemony, the formation of nationalist politics would take place (7). Having suffered under misused and failed communist policies, the prospect of economic and constitutional change was exhilarating.

Ignatieff reminds us that "historically nationalism and democracy have gone together hand and hand. Nationalism, after all is the doctrine that people have a right to rule themselves, and that sovereignty reposes in them alone" (8). For the Northern and Central European republics of the former Soviet Union most had experienced democracy before communism, or had sufficient preparation to make a relatively smooth transition from a single party state to full democracy (9). In the Southern and Asian republics which emerged from the ruins, in particular the Balkan region,

democracy was for the first time possible after centuries of rule under the Ottoman Empire, and then communism.

Tito's Yugoslavia satisfied the political aspirations of its multi-ethnic state by allowing relative authority to the majority ethnic group in each federal republic. When it collapsed at the end of the '80s, among political and economic chaos, like most emerging republics, communist party leaders changed their spots and embraced the new politics. Disregarding socialist ideas, they realised that appeals to national solidarity, and the use of nationalist rhetoric would keep them in power, even after the turmoil of the state's collapse. As examples, in Croatia Franco Tudjman's ruling HDZ (Croatian Democratic Alliance) and Serbia's regime of Slobodan Milosevic are both, despite Croatian opinion, post-communist one party states, "democratic only in the sense that their leaders' power derives from their skill as manipulators of popular emotion." (10)

The popular appeal to the new politics can be better understood by the words of the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch, quoted in 'Democrats and Demagogues':

Where an old regime disintegrates, where old social relations have become unstable, amidst the rise of general insecurity, belonging to a common language and culture may become the only certainty in society. (11)

When at last democracy became possible, tragically for the Balkans, the only language that existed (or was allowed to exist) to mobilise people into a shared social project of rebuilding was the rhetoric of ethnic difference. As Ignatieff clearly notes, "any possibility of a civic, as opposed to ethnic, democracy had been strangled at birth by the communist regime." (12)

Ethnic nationalism, where "political membership is held to be enjoyed, not irrespective of, but as a result of sharing common historical or genetic roots" (13), was



also a strong temptation for ethnic majorities, like the Baltic and Caucasian peoples, who were subject to be ruled by an imperially backed Russian minority.

Many countries viewed the breakaway, and the resultant disregard of socialist ideologies as the opportunity to restart their history, which to many had been denied in relation to Western Europe by communism. For Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States, national revival meant returning to Europe. A strong feeling of 'Europeanness', a historical 'belonging', in cities such as Lvov (W. Ukraine), and Ljubljana (Slovenia), dating from rule under the Habsburg empire, prevailed despite a fifty year cut off from Western Europe. Returning to Europe, as Ignatieff allegorizes, meant "pulling your nation, like a battered horse and cart, from the muddy ditch that is the Soviet system" (14). Seven years on, the more advanced Eastern European nations, such as Poland and the post-communist 'divorced' Czech Republic, have not only pulled themselves out of the ditch, but are knocking on the door of the exclusive (Western) European Economic Community.

Accompanying a general feeling of returning to 'history', all emerging countries redisplayed and unfurled emblems, symbols and flags after a long exile in the historical cupboard. Almost as quickly as the Berlin wall fell, all references to socialism, and communist rule, were dismantled or destroyed. In Hungary hidden plots of land became cemeteries to broken busts and statuettes of Karl Marx or Stalin. From Leipzig to Kraków the huge industrial plants, mines and shipyards, which were the epitome of working class internationalism, dumped the name 'Lenin' from their titles. Street-names in all free cities reverted to pre-revolution 'nationalist' names. All of the annexed Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania re-adopted their old flags of different colours, based on the pan-Slavic design, while the hammer, sickle and the 'cold' protractor disappeared from that of the East German flag, leading to unification with its other half. And until the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, under the guise of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Caucasian republics



and the Asian republics (Khazakstan, Tajikstan etc). waved their flags, proclaiming their national particularities, hoping to join the exodus and become 'fully fledged nations'. Key dates in pre-communist history were also re-identified, outlining patriots, martyrs and traitors, in an attempt by nationalist parties to emphasise a 'lost', glorious history subdued by socialism, and to spread the belief to the populace that it was worth the struggle for freedom. In the case of Ukraine, they brought home the body of their leader, Cardinal Slipe, who died in exile, and reclaimed churches from Russian Orthodoxy.

All these examples claimed the particularity of one nation, authenticating their claim to nationhood, free from socialist solidarity or Russian hegemony.

Unfortunately, the 're-awakening' from History in some areas proved also to overturn many stones revealing "long forgotten goblins" (15) in the former Soviet Union and post-Communist states. The lines dividing the different ethnic groups are frequently blurred and historically unclear or contested. As a feature of the sociology of the trans-Caucasian area, Central and Eastern Europe, a 'patch-work quilt' of people live together, where religious, linguistic and cultural identities have mingled and overlapped for centuries. This was supplemented by the movement of people during the Second World War as refugees, and after, for different reasons, throughout the Soviet Union. On the fall of the Soviet empire and its satellite regimes, many ethnic groups, through nationalist rhetoric, institutionalised ethnic domination of republics, leaving minorities within worried about their position in society. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, when Tito's multi-ethnic state collapsed, each national group outside its republic's borders suddenly found itself an endangered national minority. As the largest group, the Serbs felt particularly vulnerable to the rise of Croatian nationalism

Although the Croats, like the Slovenes, expressed their support for a loosely confederal Yugoslavia, both in reality were set on full national determination. Nationalists in the two richest republics, driven by economic resentment for supporting the more backward Bosnia and 'Balkan' Serbia, were convinced that they had no future inside a federal Yugoslavia following Milosevic's expansionist visions - especially Serbia's absorption of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Independence obviously appealed to the local intelligentsia and former communist party leaders, as it "would make them big fish in a small pond" (16).

Croatia claimed the right to self-determination at the same time as Slovenia in 1991, influentially backed by a newly united Germany, with a constitution which declared themselves as the state of the Croatian nation, with non-Croatians defined as protected minorities. However, while most Croats believed that their state offered the same full rights to the Serbian minority, Serbs did not see themselves as a minority, but equal to the Croats, as a fully constituted nation.

When Croatia re-established the Sahovnica, the red and white shield, on their new flag a haunting from the Second World War returned for the Serb minority. The Sahovnica was an innocent traditional Croatian emblem, but also the flag of the Nazi backed war-time regime, the Ustashe, which had exterminated a large, if still undetermined number of Serbian people. When in Autumn, 1990, Serbs were withdrawn from the Croatian police forces and the judiciary, the Serbian minority were convinced that they were witnessing a return to an ethnic state, one with a genocidal past. Manipulated by the nationalist rhetoric of Milosevic, these fears and the resultant panic led many people to ask 'Who will protect me now?', and the answer came easily to their tongue: 'Trust only those of your own blood' (17). Tragically a four year war, and now an uneasy cease-fire, started as a result of an inter-acting spiral of Serbian expansionism, Croatian independence and Serbian ethnic paranoia.



Similar conditions evolved in the Trans-Caucasian area of the former Soviet Union, where the relaxation of Soviet control was opportunisticly seized by nationalists in the Armenian enclave, Nagorny-Karabach, of Azerbaijan. Serious conflict broke out between the Christian and Shiite Muslim population over the integration of the enclave into the Armenian republic, and continued when Moscow ended direct control over Nagorny-Karabach in November 1989, with Azerbaijan resuming control. Ethnic tension and conflict between the two unfriendly neighbours still continues as the Armenian majority in the region want to be part of, and protected by the Armenian nation, while Azerbaijanis believe the land rightly belongs to their state.

The collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and later in 1991, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, from the Baltics to Central Asia, released many nations and republics to make decisions about their identity, following socialism, which ultimately for some led them towards self-determination as nation-states.

For most national and ethnic peoples the transition meant the release of socialist shackles; a freedom to speak their own language, maybe reverting back to the Latin alphabet, and to feel confident in their own culture and identity. For others it gave a chance to haul themselves out of the sinking ship of Soviet economic and social policies, a process which may take a long time for the new nations of Belarus and Ukraine. The amicable 'velvet divorce' of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia also gave hope that Eastern Europe's break-up was not based entirely upon blood and soil, love of 'our' country.

However, for just as many of the peaceful transitions, there has been, in areas where ethnic groups are so mingled and historically accommodated, an increase in tension and unfortunately conflict between ethnic groups, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Azerbaijan. Manipulated by nationalist rhetoric, they are cases of



nationalism gone wrong, hijacked by the extreme political right and self-appointed warlords, reminiscent of Mussolini's idea of a nation:

We have created a myth. The myth is a faith. It is a passion. It is necessary that it be a reality. It is a reality by the fact it is a good, a hope, a faith, that is courage. Our myth is the nation. And it is a myth, to this grandeur, that we wish to translate into a complete reality, we sub-ordinate the rest. (18)

The only notable exception may be the conflict in the Republic of Chechenya, where elected president Dzhokhar Dudayev declared the republic's independence from Russia in October 1991. Fighting began in 1994, but "it is not an ethnic conflict between Chechens and Russians, nor a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians....It is a conflict between the federal government and an illegal regime which staged a secessionist revolt" (19). Although a cease-fire is now holding and peace negotiations are beginning, the losers are the thousands of civilians who have been caught up in the regional civil war for their independence.

### on 'our' turf

As Michael Löwy rightly notes in his article 'Democrats and Demagogues', many Western European liberals often consider the Eastern nationalistic explosion, and its xenophobic manifestations, as a product of 'under-development' and the failings of a socialist political programme. It is also argued that the new rise of nationalism is only a clever device for ex-communists to keep power, as in Serbia, Bulgaria or Azerbaijan. These observations, as I have discussed previously, may indeed be true. However, such answers do not seem to account for the parallel rise in nationalist feeling and movements, both democratic and violent, within western (liberal democratic) Europe. They can be categorised, basically, into three different types:

- Firstly, opposition to the larger supra-national European Union, in the name of national sovereignty.
- Secondly, the generally (but not invariably) progressive movement for the rights of national minorities and 'oppressed' nations.
- And thirdly xenophobic nationalism, directed not against the so called enemy on the 'outside', but the enemy on the 'inside' i.e. immigrant workers and old scapegoats such as Jewish or Gypsy minorities.

*an erosion of national sovereignty*

The first half of the twentieth century, as I mentioned previously, witnessed two great re-orderings of the nation-state system on this continent, i.e. the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War One in 1918, and the bi-polarisation of Europe following World War Two between the (capitalist) West and the (Communist) East. The post-war fate of the East, and how it relates to the more recent re-ordering of nation-states, I have already discussed. For Western Europe the relationship between the post-war period and certain recent forms of nationalism in the West is less dramatic and more subtle.

In a similar way to the political integration of the Eastern European states into a larger body, in the form of the Warsaw pact, the Western European nations looked towards liberal democracy and the free market to unite them into a supra-national state, beyond the brutal nationalism witnessed and manipulated in both the World Wars. This process began in 1951 with the successful Montan Union (European Coal and Steel Community), and was followed by the Treaty of Rome (1957) which marked the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), a coalition abolishing trade and export customs between associate members. A year later the

formation of the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, increased further the number of pan-Western European organisations.

By the early 1970s it was clear that the EEC Council aimed at the gradual implementation of plans for a political and economic union and ultimately a common currency between its member states, which was now a community of ten. Great Britain's Prime Minister at the time, Edward Heath, described the organisation thus:

The community is no federation of provinces or countries. There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty...All the countries concerned recognise that an attempt to impose a majority view in a case where one or more members consider their vital interests to be at stake would imperil the very fabric of the community (20).

Today, in 1996, with ten years of a European Single Market and more importantly a fully established European Union (an increased membership of twelve and a further list of potential associates), I may be forgiven for saying that the fabric in some parts of the community is stretched to ripping point.

The progressive strengthening of the European institutions has allowed the Community to assume:

the character of a political system with (small) independent powers of taxation; common agricultural and (limited) industrial and cultural policies; authority to negotiate trade policies for the twelve member states; policies of resource distribution between the states for community goals; and there are proposals to develop common internal and external security policies. There is now an EC flag, an anthem, and a set of cultural and educational policies, designed to promote a European identity (21).

The idea of a European 'nation' ("of which a single currency and armed forces are the last major cornerstones" (22)), albeit a federal one, perched over an order of individual nations has caused great concern among sections of the Conservative governments of France and Great Britain over the intrusion into individual national sovereignty and policies. Unwilling to surrender powers over what are regarded as



areas central to the nation-state, France, for example, has insisted on retaining its independent defence policy, notably its nuclear strike force.

It is the case of Great Britain, with its strong tradition of an 'island' mentality, that has been the most stubborn and aggrieved over infringements of national control, particularly regarding the recent BSE/beef crisis and European legislation on Britain's fishing industry. The recent formation of the Referendum Party, headed by Sir James Goldsmith with a claimed membership of 50,000, highlights a steadily growing rabble of politicians, businessmen and media-tycoons proclaiming the question: who governs Britain - Brussels or Westminster ? As hinted by the name, the only party policy is to hold a referendum asking the British people whether they want to stay in 'Europe' or not. The Referendum Party's first (and possibly last) conference in Brighton packed its philosophies neatly into a multi-media showcase/event, shuffling images of European 'heroes and villains' . As Stephen Fraser reported, they conjured up "an image of the EU as a dictatorship dominated by an all-conquering Germany", and full of references to "the Third Reich and the pointlessness of defeating Hitler only for this island race to tamely hand power over now" (23). This seems to echo the sentiments of Conservative Euro-sceptics who believe that a heavily integrated Community would "leave Britain stuck on the outer rim of a federal Europe, dominated by a German-led hardcore" (24).

The dynamism of the modern nation-building enterprises of this century was based on the capacity to use historic ethnic identities based on myths and memories, the possession of unique cultural attributes and a popular identification with concrete territory that has been crystallised over centuries of conflict with neighbours. By contrast to this, Hutchinson notes that "Community leaders have tended to focus on a deliberately nebulous future, for there is little of a common past by which to unite Europeans", and that a focus on a European past "is more likely to ignite memories of religious and national conflicts" (25). The language of the Anti-European lobby, and

the blatant jingoism and stereo-typecasting used by the more right-wing tabloid newspapers surrounding such matters, certainly agitates the memory of the nationalistic past in Europe and could, hence, put a serious dent in the aims and objectives of a European Union.

minorities for majority

As I explained earlier in defining the national identity, individuals and groups retain a multiplicity of allegiances which compete with the nation-state. Most people live happily within a range of identifications such as a family, a town, a region, a nation, moving between these distinctions as the situation requires - it all depends upon sentiment and the frame of reference. On a political level, to keep allegiance towards the nation-state the key, as Peter Alter says, "lies in striking a balance between the demands of regions or national minorities for political, economic and social equality, and the need to preserve the integrity and cohesion of the nation-state" (26). The recent rise of national minority movements and the claims of sovereignty for 'oppressed' nations seems to question whether this balance is being upheld, and indeed where allegiances lie in the region or the nation-state.

To begin I feel it would be useful to travel back along the historical track, and briefly examine the development of 'official nationalism' in Europe. Throughout the course of the 19th century, especially during the latter half, the great dynasties of Europe began experiencing cultural, and therefore, political difficulties due to a rise in internal nationalist claims. Benedict Anderson observes that:

the fundamental legitimacy of most of these dynasties had nothing to do with nationalness. Romanovs ruled over Tartars and Letts, Germans and Armenians, Russians and Finns. Habsburgs were perched high over Magyars and Croats, Slovaks and Italians, Ukrainians and Austro-Germans.



Hanoverians presided over Bengalis and Québécois, as well as Scots and Irish, English and Welsh. (27)

However, the sheer size and elephantiasis of the dynastic states, and the philological-lexicographic revolution at that time, ultimately led to an increased awareness of national groups within the empires. The development of language, in its written form, created by print and spread by capitalism, moulded a conviction that languages (in Europe) were the “personal property of a quite specific group, that being their daily speakers and readers, and that these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals” (28). Therefore, to the dynastic rulers the necessity of a unifying ‘state’ language was paramount if they were to keep all parts of the empire together. The dilemma was that the adoption of one vernacular as state-language would arouse antipathy from the other speakers.

Insofar as by the mid-19th century most dynasties were using some vernacular as the language of state, and on account of the rising prestige of the ‘nation’ over Europe, there tended to be a noticeable slide among the Euro-Mediterranean monarchies towards national identification:

Romanovs discovered they were Great Russians, Hanoverians that they were English, Hohenzollerns that they were Germans - and with rather more difficulty their cousins turned Romanian, Greek and so forth. (29)

These ‘naturalisations’, as Anderson describes them, of Europe’s dynasties eventually led to ‘official nationalism’, and can be best understood as a means for combining naturalisation with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglots of land accumulated since the Middle Ages. In other words “stretching the short, tight skin of a nation over the gigantic body of the empire” (30). Hence the transformation of monarchy and empire, to that of a nation brought, to many parts of Europe, a form of standardisation never witnessed before, in the forms of a state-language, the development of a state-education, and a central governing capital. Regions with a strong cultural identity and self-awareness within these ‘new’ nations



often found themselves subjected and handicapped by this national 'veil' spread over the empire (31). This could also apply to the French republican ideal of the nation which created a similar form of 'official nationalism', spreading an even layer of sovereignty over all its citizens, and therefore over all its regions.

In other parts of Europe, in the latter half of the 19th century, new nations were being formed, the biggest in the name of Germany and Italy, from amalgamations of small kingdoms and principalities to form a national state. In contrast to the French ideal of the state, proclaiming that it was the state which created the nation, the German and Italian nationalists believed it was the nation, its people, which created the state. In other words, what gave unity to the nation, was not shared civic rights, but peoples pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs etc.

Throughout the same time span Spain and Great Britain, now regarded historically as an early example of a federal nation-state, held together without the intra-nationalistic problems of the other empires in Europe (32). Spain, united in 1579 when independent kingdoms merged, allowed relative tolerance to the regional, cultural and linguistic differences, in particular to the Catalan region, within the Iberian peninsula. Meanwhile Britain, a pioneer in civic nationalism, was already by the mid-eighteenth century a nation-state composed of four nations - the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh and the English - united by a civic rather than ethnic bond, or in other words by shared attachment to the role of law, Parliament and the Crown.

During the two World Wars many minority nationalists exploited the collapse of established nation-states to achieve, with varying success, national autonomy. Following the First World War popular nationalist movements, suppressed by 'official nationalism', led the way in the formation of new nation-states from the territory of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Tsarist Empires. Even in the West, Britain

fell victim to this trend with the secession of much of Ireland to the formation of an independent Irish republic. Nationalists in both East and West Europe (Bretons, Croats, Slovaks, Ukrainians) also sought freedom from their existing states, by an ill-fated collaboration with their Nazi invaders during the Second World War.

However, the reappearance of national minority rights and ethnicity as a matrix of political mobilisation in the 1960s marked a change of direction for minority nationalism:

Many of the minority nationalist movements, although expressing romantic themes of authenticity, were modernist in outlook, attracting - in addition to the standard constituency of lawyers, teachers and journalists - support from a new technical intelligentsia of economists, administrators and social specialists. (33)

They also, as John Hutchinson notes, applied a left-wing communitarian ideology, evoking links with the then contemporary Third-World national liberation movements against imperial capitalist states, and in some cases inspired campaigns of revolutionary violence. For example the ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) and the IRA (Irish Republican Army), both of which still operate today.

Although the Marxist rhetoric subsided in the 1980s, the continuing themes - rejection of an over-centralised bureaucratic state, support for local economies and cultures, ecological issues, access for minorities to media and communications - became institutionalised policies of minority movements in modern Europe.

An overview of the prominent themes today can be split generally into two, according to region: Firstly on a cultural level, the need to defend a way of life, focusing on criteria such as language and folk-culture, which are threatened by a centralised government imposing 'alien' norms and values, to which the Welsh and Breton nationalist movements adhere. The formation of nationalist movements among the indigenous tribes of Europe, and the adoption of nationalist language to



express their discontent at the nation-state system, mirrors these sentiments. For example the 1.5 million Scanian people, who inhabit the Oresund and Kattegatt regions next to the Baltic Sea in Sweden, claim to have no local administration entity (i.e. they are governed from Stockholm) and no official institutions with a regional view of culture and history. Skank Framtid, the organisation leading for political change in the region, claims that “the Swedish central state has since the beginning attempted to erase cultural identity and regional awareness” and that it is guilty of the “re-nationalisation”<sup>(34)</sup> of the Scanian people.

Secondly, in regard to above, the other prominent theme in the demands of minority nationalism is that of the political: the demand for a real decentralisation of decision-making powers to the communities in the regions, of which Scottish nationalism is a strong example.

As Alter writes in chapter 5, ‘The Renaissance of Nationalism’, of Nationalism:

The breeding ground for regionalism in centralist nation-states is provided by the continuing presence of both economic heterogeneity and cultural and linguistic disparity”<sup>(35)</sup>.

Alter continues by noting, however, that as an example in France most Bretons, Corsicans, Alsatians and Provençals speak a second language, different to French, but nevertheless all French political parties reject the idea that France can be called a multi-national state. On the contrary, according to the French (or that of most civic nation-states’) concept of the nation any inhabitant with French citizenship is French. In Alter’s words this French perspective “rules out the possibility of equating regionalism with nationalism, and dismisses any understanding of regionalism based on certain cultural and linguistic peculiarities and on economic grievances as a new nationalism ‘from below’”<sup>(36)</sup>. However, Alter also adds that it would be wrong to argue, as a matter of principle, that regionalism is not equal to nationalism. Both aim



to decentralise or devolve power from a greater body. For some nationalist parties, such as the Scottish National Party, devolution “may be the means of achieving their longed-for goal of independence” (37).

As I stated in the first section of this essay, ‘a nation will only exist if a body of people feel themselves to be a nation’. The difference between a regionalist movement and that of a nationalist one, as Hutchinson suggests, may depend upon how much the minorities identify themselves solely as a ‘national’ minority, or whether they regard themselves as having a dual identity, for example Scottish and British, Basques and Spanish or Breton and French (38).

The sense of a ‘dual national identity’ can be witnessed, I feel, most truthfully in one of the oldest nation-states in Europe, the United Kingdom of Great Britain. As I stated earlier Great Britain as a nation-state is the composition of four nations - the Scots, the Irish, the Welsh, and English - joined by shared allegiance to a united Crown, Parliament and law. However, the dismantling of Britain’s colonial status after the Second World War, and the differential growth economically and industrially throughout the country revitalised regional and cultural identities. As some political experts believe, identities which had previously been subdued by the common interests generated by a colonial empire and two World Wars (39). Throughout the 1980s the peripheral regions (or the ‘Celtic Fringe’ as it is often referred to) of Scotland and Wales were also badly affected by the de-construction (or fall in demand) of the heavy industries, such as coal-mining, steel manufacture and ship-building. Due to the concentration of these industries in the peripheral regions, localised mass unemployment caused great disillusionment with the then present political system. Furthermore, the introduction of unpopular policies, such as the Poll Tax, by the Conservative (strongly unionist) government to Scotland did nothing further to bolster support for a government centralised in London.

On account of all these factors, it is Scotland, with an increasingly strong cultural awareness, and hence an increased self-consciousness (40), that seems most likely to translate regionalist emotions into a nationalist goal. The Scottish National Party suffered a loss of electoral support during the 1980s, following the waning of the regionalist movement in Britain. However, the 1990s has seen an upsurge in the support and fortunes of the nationalist party and this may be explained, as Hutchinson suggests:

by the inspiration offered by growing European Community integration, which in the eyes of many activists offers the prospect of dismantling existing nation-states in favour of a Europe of nations and regions (41).

Therefore, as with many of the regionalist-turn-nationalist movements in Europe, "independence would mean that Scotland could take a real and meaningful place as a small nation in the European Union" (42). It should be noted that although the SNP holds approximately 25% of the Scottish vote (43) they still sit second behind the Labour Party in many of the Scottish constituencies. However the SNP can only gain from the recent mistrust this year (1996) of the Labour Party's promise that genuine regional devolution would follow election to Parliament.

The recognition of ethnicity has led some analysts to explain the resurgence of minority nationalism in the terms of a longer-range pattern. One of the most influential, as Hutchinson informs us, is the 'internal colonialist' approach of Hechter. This theory suggests that the persistence of ethnic distinctions within the modern nation-state may be explained by the fact that most Western states have been formed by one ethnic group or another outwith the nation. Hutchinson continues:

A hierarchical cultural division of labour was established which shaped the subsequent processes of industrialisation in so far as elite positions were reserved for adherents of the dominant culture, and the economy of the peripheral groups was subordinated to the interests of the centre. The emergence of minority nationalism citing economic and cultural grievances against the European states is thus explained by reference to institutionalised patterns of discrimination in resource allocation. (44).



However, this theory offers no explanation of, and hence cannot apply to, movements of autonomy in relatively wealthy populations such as the Basques of Spain and Northern Italy.

The Basque region, far from being economically disadvantaged, is along with Catalonia the financial and industrial hub of the Spanish state. The 1979 Spanish constitution defines Spain as a multi-cultural country and grants regional self-government to the 'nationalities'. The central governments generous concessions allowing regional autonomy satisfied all but the Basque nationalist movement, who saw regional devolution as only an interim measure, leading to their ultimate goal:

to unite the three Spanish Basque provinces of Guipúzco, Vizcaya and Alava with the three Basque *arrondissements* of Basses-Pyrénées in the South-West France, and the Spanish region of Navarra, the north of which is inhabited by Basques. With a population of three million the seven 'Basque Provinces' would be joined in an independent state. (46)

However, the radical plan to form a Basque nation-state has not, unfortunately, gone without terrorist violence and as yet it is unclear whether French Basques are sympathetic to the cause, on account that there has been no formation of a separatist party over the border in France.

The rise of the Northern League in Italy, with its use of nationalist rhetoric, seems to ominously mirror the pattern of thought witnessed across the Adriatic Sea in Croatia, a few years before the collapse of Yugoslavia. As David Willey reported on the 15th of September 1996:

to the cheers of a few thousand green-shirted Northern League supporters, Umberto Bossi and his new self-styled 'government' made a formal declaration of independence of the state of Pandania on the quayside from where Venetian war galleys used to set off to do battle with the Turks. (47)

The declaration of the independence of Pandania, the state of the Po River valley, was the end product of agitation towards the centralised Rome government by the



Northern League, stretching back six months to before the Italian elections. Initially the aim of the Northern League movement appeared to be the federalism of the Italian state, and thus decentralisation of power. However, Bossi discovered that "he was pushing at an open door: Romano Prodi's centre-left Olive Tree coalition government, which emerged victorious from the elections, firmly committed itself to making federalism a reality" (48). In response the Northern League shifted ground to focus its demands on actual secession, full autonomy, rather than just federal reform.

As I mentioned above, the reasons for a breakaway smack of similar events across the Adriatic, when the wealthy, highly-industrialised Croatia and Slovenia wished to shake off the 'backward' Balkan regions. The Northern League preferably wish themselves to be comparable to Czech and Slovak 'divorce' settlement, although they ring more truthfully as a movement driven by economic resentment for supporting the poorer South:

[Bossi] argues that Italy effectively already has two economic systems - the wealthy, entrepreneurial North, where unemployment is only 6.5%, where exports are booming and where the Maastricht convergence criteria are already met; and the lazy, unproductive South, where unemployment is over 22%, where hands are always outstretched for subsidies wrung from hard-working Northerners, the pockets of the corrupt politicians are bottomless and the Mafia rules. (49)

Bossi says that his declaration of independence will be put into effect a year from now, whether Rome is ready or not. Europe's newest 'nation' appears well prepared, even if populous support is not apparent at the moment, with all the regalia of a nation-state: a flag, a national anthem, and plans to establish its own currency, create its own police force, appoint its own judges and seek recognition from foreign states. However, it appears the lessons have not been learnt from their cousins across the water in the former Yugoslavia, as Bossi declares that he intends to install a provisional government immediately, and wants to purge the judiciary and teaching profession of Southerners: the racial undertones are ominous.

*enemies on the inside*

The resurgence of the more extreme xenophobic and racial forms of nationalism, although still a minority, can be seen throughout most parts of Europe, East and West. For some political commentators it is "probably the greatest threat to liberal democracy since Communism" (50). Right-wing and racist political parties can be found to be operating quite successfully on a local level (Britain, Belgium), and in some countries on a regional and national level, for example in Italy, France, Germany and Austria. Michael Löwy suggests in his article 'Democrats and Demagogues' that in total the number of voters for quasi-Fascist and Fascist movements could account to seven million in the European Union. Even if this number seems insignificant in comparison to the accumulated population of the Union, it is still a significant number of people willing to accept 'backward looking' policies which in many cases simply boils down to identifying scapegoats for social, political and economic problems.

On a more extreme level, neo-Nazi groups in France, Germany and Britain are increasingly receiving notorious publicity in the media for violent and criminal attacks on ethnic minorities and immigrants, of which the Rostock murders and asylum-burning in Germany in 1992 received most coverage. In Eastern Europe 'skin' culture - the racism, the haircut, the music - seems to have taken grip on a sizeable minority in the former-communist states of Poland and Hungary. As Ignatieff cynically remarks, "skin culture may just be Britain's most enduring contribution to Germany and the new Europe" (51).

Both politicians and neo-Nazis justify their opinions by appealing to the so-called best interests of the nation. Alter notes that they adhere to the old Darwinian belief, translated into the language of nations, "that all nations are caught up in an animal struggle for survival, and interpret it in their own simplistic way" (52).



For example a neo-Nazi slogan in Germany is 'Ausländeraus' ('foreigners out' *of our nation*); in France spokespeople of Le Pen's right-wing party warn of an Arab 'invasion' of their country; in Great Britain the British National Party blames Asian immigrants for the housing shortage in the East End of London.

Not just a problem in the western states, the post-Communist years for the eastern European states have been difficult times, witness to its own form of nationalistic xenophobia. The return of the repressed central European 'disease', to Hungary, former East Germany and Poland, has been marked by a small, but notable increase in hostility towards foreigners, both verbal and physical. Once harbringers of democracy and good times - freedom, jobs, fashion, holidays abroad - westerners are now associated among a minority of bitter eastern Europeans (particularly the elderly and the stupid) as the 'givers' of inflation, austerity plans and unemployment (53).

Yet Benedict Anderson in chapter 8, 'Patriotism and Racism', of Imagined Communities states that nationalism and racism are certainly not same monster. Racism, according to Anderson, "erases nation-ness by reducing the adversity to his biological physiognomy" (54). Discussing this point further, he explains that the fact of the matter is:

nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history (55).

Meanwhile Adorno, quoted by Michael Löwy, emphasises that "the awakening of nationalism is the most favourable climate for the upsurge of racism and intolerance" (56). This statement seems to me to run parallel with Hroch's quote earlier - 'amidst the rise of general insecurity, belonging to a common language and culture may become the only certainty in society'. Extreme nationalism is the product of political, social and economic upheavals. As Alter proposes, the global economic crisis since



the late '80s, high unemployment, de-industrialisation, the formation of a new underclass of anxious citizens, and the influx of growing numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Third World, may have brought a 'favourable climate' for xenophobic nationalism (57). The combination of the confrontation with 'otherness', and the resentment at the deficiencies of parliamentary democracy is a strong concoction which could breed nationalist demagoguery. For central and eastern Europeans, the decline of socialist and class values, in conjunction with the torrid re-adjustment from communism to liberal democracy, has brought with it new 'Western' economic and social problems like unemployment, poverty and crime. So for some with minds clouded with resentment of change, these problems may not be attributed "to the failures of capitalism, but to the presence of immigrants and other foreigners" (58).

### Chapter 3: Implications and Future Consequences

Looking in a objective way at the recent rise in nationalism across the globe, and then commenting upon how it may shape our future is no easy task. As I mentioned in the introduction to the second section of this essay it is impossible to summarise every claim of particularity, every nationalist movement. In restricting this study to the European continent I feel that I have examined (and kept within my grasp) the main themes of modern nationalism surfacing in our world today. Even so several examples and conditions within this geographical limitation I have omitted to allow this study to breathe - for example the tensions in Northern Ireland between Unionists and Irish nationalists; in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities which split the island; in Belgium where the old nation-state framework appears to almost defunct, skimming over two federal ethnic regions consisting of Flemish people and the French Walloons. If it is at all possible to lump each particular together and give a universal explanation, I quote Sue Clifford:

many of us understand ourselves in the world as much through a relationship with a small patch of ground (or more than one) as with people, indeed it is hard to separate them. (1)

Although in Clifford's text the 'small patch' refers to the intensely local 'parish', I feel it is just as apt to relate the quote to a national people and its imagined community.

In common with most nationalist movements I have discussed there appears to be an increased affirmation of the ethnic identity over that of the established nation-state. Umberto Ecco, in his essay 'The Return To The Middle Ages', states that:

a series of minorities, rejecting integration, form clans, and each clan picks a neighbourhood that becomes its own centre, often inaccessible. (2)

In the language of nationalism the minorities are ethnic minorities, the clans are nations, the neighbourhood is the national territory, and for the 'others' - the foreigners - citizenship is almost inaccessible.



Although certain nationalist movements, such as the Scottish National Party, adhere strictly to a liberal constitution (3) and see themselves as democratic movements, there is a tendency towards the emergence of exclusive, mono-cultural entities describing themselves as nations. As an example, in the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and in Ukraine, most governmental policies fail to acknowledge the cultures and traditions of the sizeable Russian minority who live within their borders. Ironically this is leading to the formation of anti-establishment Russian nationalist movements in these countries.

The re-emergence of ethnic alignment in Europe has been seen in its most tragic form in the former Yugoslavia. Since the cease-fire in the Bosnian republic it appears impossible to return to the multi-ethnic state of the past, as the civil war which ripped apart the state remobilised the ethnic groups into pure fractions throughout the country. Described euphemistically as 'ethnic-cleansing', whole communities of either Muslims, Serbs or Croats were brutally killed or forced to leave their homes, 're-settled' in their own territory. For example Zvornik, a city situated on border between Bosnia and Serbia, had a Muslim community which made up 60% of the total population of the city (4). Now, after the war, the city is purely home to Serbs, and according to the television documentary Purity, it was not an isolated incident within the country, but "a well planned system set on the same plan"- to segregate the state into pure ethnic regions (5). The mistrust between the ethnic communities (which, I may point out, lived side by side prior to the war) that has been generated may have scarred this area forever. Thankfully there has been no recent ethnic violence on the scale witnessed between 1991-95, but as the recent election polls in Bosnia illustrated, it will be a long time before there is a bridging of the ethnic divide in this area of Europe (6).

With regard to the rest of Europe, John Hutchinson suggests:

It is implausible that we will see a repetition of this disaster in Western Europe where liberal democratic institutions tend to moderate conflicts, and even where there are irreconcilable enmities between dominant and minority groups in Europe, a collapse of or secession from the nation-state is unlikely. (7)

He continues by claiming the reason for this is that the core nationalities of the Western nations "strongly identify with the integrity of the state" (8). However, support for the integrity of federal nation-states, such as Great Britain, Belgium, Spain (and worldwide - Canada, India), appears to have diminished, highlighted by the formation of regionalist-turned-nationalist movements in these countries. In our post-colonial world this mere statement raises questions about whether ethnic categorisations have always been held above that of the nation-state.

As I discussed previously, the prospect of growing European integration, and on a world-wide scale similar pan-continental trading blocks, has inspired or re-stoked regional or ethnic identities keen to break the mould of the nation-state. Umberto Bossi, the Italian Northern League's leader, is questioning: why should the European Union not have forty or fifty regions as members rather than just fifteen nation-states, so it includes German *länders*, Spanish provinces, Italian regions, British kingdoms? His reasoning for devolution is thus:

With a European single currency in prospect and common EU defence and foreign policies planned, the nation-state is losing its purpose, the autonomous region is the most logical political unit. (9)

Bossi may indeed be correct, but it is unlikely that the route towards a 'United States of Europe' will be anything other than difficult. It seems ironic that the original underlying aim of a federal 'European' nation-state was to transcend the nationalism witnessed on the continent this century when the idea has been met by exactly that in resistance to giving up the full powers of sovereignty.



John Hutchinson notes, however, that it should be recognised that the trends towards internationalisation are more than just rhetoric:

The dangers of nuclear armaments and their proliferation; the greenhouse effect and the world-wide destruction of our planet's ecology; the spread of global technologies; mass international labour migrations and the need to protect the human rights of these peoples have all spurred the development of international organisations and fora, and require that limitations be placed on the sovereignties of the nation-state (10).

In addition, the spread of capitalism throughout the world has led to multi-national production and companies, crossing the traditional national 'boundaries' of language, culture and geography. Furthermore charitable and campaigning bodies such as OXFAM and Amnesty International span the globe irrespective of national identity. Hence the interplay between supranationalist or pan-continental pressures, nation-statism and minority nationalism has meant that achieving a secure existence for the peoples of Europe will not be easy.

### our millennial airport

Heading towards the end of the millennium we live in an increasingly 'small' world. The information revolutions, in the form of satellite and cable communications, have re-enforced the concept of the 'global village' and travelling round the world no longer takes 80 days thanks to ever more frequent and faster air flights. Eric Hobsbawm even suggests the international airport as the embodiment of the global village which we live in:

A large enclosed space, you don't know looking around at where you are...All that surrounds you are the names of international airlines, the symbols that are supposed to be comprehensible to anybody no matter your language, and of course the English language, the pigeon tongue of the late 20th century, plus multi-national stores [where you can buy the same items in any airport anywhere]. (11)



The conceptual shrinking of our world through travel, technology and global communications, increasing American cultural hegemony and the post-colonial rise in mass-migration has undoubtedly eroded and dissolved the boundaries which 19th century governments originally built defining the 'national' and the 'foreign'. The idea of a racially exclusive, ethnically pure nation-state, as Europe has tragically witnessed on several accounts this century, is and will be even harder to define in reality. Ethnic and Xenophobic nationalists hence have the task of convincing ordinary people to disregard stubbornly adverse sociological realities, for instance the fact that most societies are not and never have been ethnically pure. It is for this reason that Michael Ignatieff suggests that nationalism "is a form of speech which shouts, not merely so that it will be heard, but so that it will believe itself" (12).

Jacques Derrida suggests in his essay The Other Heading that "the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be responding to the call or assignation of the universal" (13). If this statement is true, in relation to nationalism, will different peoples - ethnic, racial, religious groups - continue to assert their distinctive rights, cultures and interests against international integration and cosmopolitanism ?

Returning to Hobsbawm's metaphor of the millennial airport, all the people who sit about, move through departure lounges, travel along escalators - from all the continents of the world - they all know who they are, what their individual identity is, and they continue to know. Their identity is not destroyed, but indeed it is very different from the identity of their ancestors of small towns, villages and communities where they live. The world is changing fast, probably faster than we can travel. Can the rise of nationalism at the end of this century be explained as large groups and regions of people having trouble identifying with their community, their 'small patch of ground', in an increasingly homogeneous world ? Eqbal Ahmed echoes this question and proposes an answer in the television programme The Stories Our Countries Tell Us:

As the world shrinks it destroys communal and traditional identities, but while old identities are being destroyed, alternative identities are not emerging. Individuals and large groups seek identities which hark back to old identities, either what is left or what they imagine is left. (14)

Nationalism originally has its roots in democracy and the right to self government. For many peoples of Europe, and the world, the language of nationalism offers an opportunity, a chance to empower themselves and govern their own affairs to suit their own needs. For others, particularly indigenous peoples and tribes, a nation of their own would mean they would no longer be at risk from the spectre of 'ethnic cleansing', protected by the codes of nationhood. In this sense every person must have a home, a place of safety, somewhere they belong:

Only a person who has no mother knows what a mother is, only a person without land knows what land is. (15)

However, the term nationalism is increasingly becoming synonymous with the language of difference and the hatred of the other. For many it has almost completely lost its former liberal appeal of equality and justice for anyone, anywhere. As Eqbal Ahmed notes, "when you organise collective emotions on the basis of difference, it is going to promote extremes and hatred" (16).

Micheael Ignatieff suggests that the only reliable antidote to ethnic nationalism is civic nationalism, as "the only guarantee that ethnic groups will live side by side in peace is shared loyalty to a state" (17). If that is the case it would be necessary that a new understanding or ideology is formulated so that we can look forward into the future, rather than casting our identities in the past. Jacques Derrida offers that other heading, in a new direction, by proposing we develop an ideology which respects:

differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of majority and an opposition to racism, nationalism and xenophobia. (18)

Otherwise we may be warned of this ideology of difference: if we can differentiate between us and them today, who will it be tomorrow ? Who will it be the day after that ? There appears no end to such a spiral which undoubtedly leads downwards into the depths of darkness.

If there is hope for the future, Umberto Eco offers it to us. In describing the collapse of the Pax-Romana, and the period leading up to the first millennium AD, he writes:

At the collapse of a great Pax, crisis and insecurity ensue, different civilisations clash, and slowly the image of a new man is outlined. It will come clear only afterwards, but the basic elements are already there, bubbling in the dramatic cauldron. (19)

We should all dream of the true renaissance.



## **ENDNOTES**

1. CRANE BRITON, Ideas & Men, page 500.  
(taken from D. B. HEATER, Political Ideas In The Modern World page 29)

### **Chapter 1: Defining and imagining a nation**

2. ERIC HOBSBAWM, television programme ARENA: The Stories Our Countries Tell Us.
3. FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MEN, 1791  
Ibid.
4. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Ibid.
5. IAN ANGEL, Ibid.
6. H. KOHN, Nationalism: It's meaning and history, page 9.  
(taken from RICHARD JAY, Political Ideologies, page 165)
7. Originally formulated by Henri Tajfel in 1974, and more recently developed by Hogg and Abrams under the title 'self-categorisation', Social Identity Theory is not primarily a theory of nationalism. It is a general theory of group identity, explaining universal psychological principles, which are presumed to be behind all forms of group identity.
8. HENRI TAJFEL, Human Groups & Social Categories, page 229.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 66)
9. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 66.
10. DESMOND TU TU, television programme ARENA: The Stories Our Countries Tell Us
11. HENRI TAJFEL, Human Groups & Social Categories, page 256.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 66)
12. Hogg & Abrams, Social Identity Theory, page 172.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 66)
13. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 6.
14. Ibid. page 6.
15. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 69.
16. Ibid. page 69. [author's text added]
17. Ibid. page 69.
18. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 70.
19. See Chapter 11, 'Memory and Forgetting'  
BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities
20. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 206.
21. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 72.
22. Ibid. page 73.

23. A. D. SMITH, The Ethnic Revival, page 65.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 74)
24. NIGEL HARRIS, National Liberation, page 258.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 74)
25. Ibid. page 74.
26. RICHARD MUIR, Modern Political Geography, page 119.
27. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 75.
28. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 19.
29. An example of how deep within nationalist consciousness this unity lies, can be seen in the categories for a country, and its people. The same linguistic root generally gives rise to the singular name of the state, or country (Germany, Chile, Pakistan): and a collective noun for describing the people, who supposedly possesses the state (the Germans, the Chileans, the Pakistanis). One notable exception is the United Kingdom.
30. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 79.
31. JULIA KRISTEVA, Strangers To Ourselves, page 96.
32. W. G. SUMNER, Folkways, page 13.  
(taken from MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 79)
33. MICHAEL BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, page 83.
34. Ibid. page 77.

## Chapter 2: Filling the imagination with reality

1. GWYN PRINS, Spring in Winter, intro xiii.
2. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and belonging, page 8.
3. MICHAEL LÖWY, article 'Democrats and Demagogues', page 12.
4. JANUSZ ZIOLKOWSKI, 'The roots and blossoms of Solidarnosc', page 47  
Chapter 5, Spring in Winter.
5. Ibid. page 47
6. This statement has recently been backed up by an admission from Yevgeny Iyonovich, the general who spearheaded the devastating assault on Budapest in 1956. Controversially admitting, for the first time in public, that the military intervention was a defence of the Soviet empire, and not a Western instigated uprising. "After an objective re-evaluation, and the clearing perspective of four decades", the general admits that the student-led 1956 Revolution was, "a rising by the entire Hungarian nation against the ruling communist party clique of Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero. It was a fight for freedom and independence of the country". This is contrary from the claim that "reactionary grouping and fascist hooligans have risen against the people's power", and that the Soviet army was merely giving "fraternal aid" to a fellow state. Quoted from GABRIEL RONAY's newspaper article 'Ex general explodes soviet myth'.
7. This however does not apply to the breakdown of Yugoslavia after 1989, as it was an independant state, liberated from Soviet hegemony in 1948 by Tito's vision of a communist federal state.

8. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 17.
9. For a comprehensive layout of political developments in these regions see Sarah Humphey's appendix: "A comparative chronology of revolution 1988-90", Spring in Winter, page 211.
10. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 14.
11. MICHAEL LÖWY, article 'Democrats and Demagogues', page 12.
12. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 17.
13. RICHARD JAY, Political Ideologies, page 162.
14. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 95.
15. SALMAN RUSHDIE, television programme WITHOUT WALLS: The End of History.
16. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 18.
17. Ibid. page 6.
18. BENITO MUSSOLINI, Mussolini's Italy, page 218.
19. VALENTIN KUVIN,  
(taken from TREVOR ROYLE's newspaper article 'Yeltsin sets hostage deadline')
20. EDWARD HEATH  
(Quoted from Bill Cash's article within 'Focus Special: Europe on the Brink')
21. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 138.
22. BILL CASH, newspaper article 'Focus Special: Europe on the Brink'.
23. STEPHEN FRASER, newspaper article 'Sir James Launches His Crusade'
24. BILL CASH, newspaper article 'Focus Special: Europe on the Brink'.
25. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 143.
26. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 98.
27. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 83.
28. Ibid. page 84.
29. Ibid. page 85.
30. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 86.
31. The reader may note the striking similarity between the 'official nationalism' of the late 19th century empires, and the Sovietisation suffered by the republics within the former USSR and its satellite states.
32. This may be due to the success of the sea-going British and Spanish empires, and their colonies abroad, during this period.
33. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 149.
34. Author Unknown, Scania Nation  
<http://www.halycon.com/pub/FWPD/Eurasia/scania.txt>



35. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 99.
36. Ibid. page 99.
37. KENNY FARQUHARSON, newspaper article 'Salmond uses his loaf'
38. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 152.
39. RICHARD JAY, Political Ideologies, page 173.  
for further reading see TOM NAIRN, The Break-up of Britain.
40. I refer to the burgeoning success of Scottish literature and film industry, and the mainstream success of Hollywood films depicting Scottish heroes and historical 'freedom' fighters i.e. 'Rob Roy' and 'Braveheart'. I may also note upon the increasing sense (and popularity of) independence among the Scottish media, in both tabloid and 'broadsheet' newspapers, e.g. Scotland on Sunday's slogan "The independent voice of Scotland".
41. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 148.
42. Author Unknown, Best For Scotland - A Real Scottish Parliament  
<http://www.snp.org.uk/library/rr960808.html>
43. SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY website  
<http://www.snp.org.uk>
44. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 149.  
for further reading see MICHAEL HECHTER, Internal Colonialism
45. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 100.
46. Ibid. page 100.  
(for further reading on the Basque region see ANDREW BILLEN's travel article, 'Atlantis on land').
47. DAVID WILLEY, newspaper article 'Rome bemused by the birth in Venice'.
48. NICK PARSONS, newspaper article 'Pandania Sirs Fact and Fantasy'.
49. Ibid.
50. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 94.
51. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 61.
52. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 94.
53. ADAM LEBOR, newspaper article 'Hungarian Hostility Comes To Surface'.
54. BENEDICT ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, page 148.
55. Ibid. page 149.
56. MICHAEL LÖWY, article 'Democrats and Demagogues', page 13.
7. PETER ALTER, Nationalism, page 95.
58. MICHAEL LÖWY, article 'Democrats and Demagogues', page 13.

### Chapter 3: Implications and Future Consequences

1. SUE CLIFFORD, 'Places, People and Parish Maps', From Place to Place, page 3.
2. UMBERTO ECCO, Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality, page 76.
3. As an example the Scottish National Party's proposed constitution for an independent Scotland, states in regards to citizenship that:  
"[each] person whose place of birth was in Scotland...shall be a citizen of Scotland" *aswell as* "every person whose principle place of residence is in Scotland at the date of this constitution comes into force shall be a citizen of Scotland". Quote taken from SNP website.
4. Television programme, FASCISM: Purity.
5. Ibid.
6. PAUL HARRIS, newspaper article 'Polling ends on a sour note'
7. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 162.
8. Ibid. page 162.
9. NICK PARSONS, newspaper article 'Pandania Stirs Fact and Fiction'
10. JOHN HUTCHINSON, Modern Nationalism, page 160.
11. ERIC HOBSBAWM, television programme ARENA: The Stories Our Countries Tell Us.  
[author's text added]
12. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 186.
13. JACQUES DERRIDA, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe, page 73.
14. EQBAL AHMED, television programme ARENA: The Stories Our Countries Tell Us.
15. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging, page 101.
16. EQBAL AHMED, television programme ARENA: The Stories Our Countries Tell Us
17. MICHAEL IGNATEIFF, Blood and Belonging, page 185.
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